Greece’s foreign policy metamorphoses - Part 1

The past 15 years have transformed Greek foreign policy, creating strategic alliances based on energy, defence and the Law of the Sea, but its biggest problem, maritime borders with Turkey, remains

This article is the first of three, originally written as a chapter for ‘Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean’, a strategic dossier published this month by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). It is presented here in full for the first time.

Prime ministers George Papandreou, October 2009-November 2011 (L) and Antonis Samaras, June 2012-December 2015

SINCE 2009, four interrelated geopolitical challenges have led to never-before-seen movement in Greek foreign policy. Greece’s bankruptcy following five years of conservative misrule, undermined its economic and diplomatic leadership in Southeast Europe. The refugee crisis of 2015 challenged Greek land and maritime borders with Turkey. Greece’s new energy relationships with Cyprus, Israel and Egypt caused Turkey to dispute Greek jurisdiction in the east Mediterranean, and tensions spilled into open geopolitical rivalry in 2020. The Ukraine war amplified their divergent geopolitical paths. Since 2023, Greece and Turkey have tried to normalize their relations, agreeing to disagree about their maritime boundaries while embracing a friendlier public posture, but tensions keep resurfacing.

1. Introduction: Catastrophe

The post-2008 global financial crisis laid bare the mismanagement of Greece’s finances by its political élites. Greece caused an eruption when it presented the Eurogroup with a €36bn deficit equivalent to 15.4% of GDP in October 2009, far above the 3% threshold allowed under the Stability and Growth Pact. “The game is over!” shouted its president, Jean-Claude Juncker, referring to the Greek practice of constantly rejigging statistics. The following March Greece was forced out of markets, selling its last 10-year bond in almost a decade^[1] at 6.5% interest.